13 ideas
| 7529 | All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell] |
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
| 14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
| 4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |